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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
submitted that the third-party defendant's subjective knowledge,
coupled with the notice received through disclosure devices such as
the discovery proceeding and the bill of particulars, should have
precluded a claim of prejudice, and that the third-party complaint
should have been amended to conform to the evidence provided at
trial.
It is suggested that an amendment of the pleadings under sec-
tion 3025(c) should be barred only by the existence of actual and
substantial prejudice incapable of remedy by the imposition of
costs and continuances, 40 and should not be precluded by a mere
technical defect in the pleading.41 Such a standard would further
the purpose of the CPLR while diminishing the importance of
pleadings to underscore the substantive rights involved, 42 and the
merits.43
Nancy L. Montmarquet
CPLR 3211: Admission that contract existed does not defeat de-
fendant's motion to dismiss based on a statute of frauds defense
Section 3211(a)(5) of the CPLR permits a defendant to move
to dismiss a cause of action on the ground that the plaintiff has
failed to satisfy the statute of frauds.' For purposes of the motion,
preclude once the third-party plaintiff had failed to timely serve the particulars, the bill
should be treated as if it had been served in a timely manner and should be deemed suffi-
cient notice of the defective seat belt.
40 See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also CPLR 3025, commentary at 487
(McKinney 1974) (irremediable prejudice main barrier to amendment under 3025(c)).
It is suggested that in DiMauro, no actual or substantial prejudice existed because any
adverse effect on the third-party defendant resulting from the interjection of the seat belt
issue at trial could have been alleviated by the granting of a continuance. This would have
provided additional time for the third-party defendant to prepare to address this new issue
by securing the services of a seat belt expert who could have testified on her behalf. See
DiMauro, 105 App. Div. 2d at 241, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 389.
"4 See Forman v. Davidson, 74 App. Div. 2d 505, 506, 424 N.Y.S.2d 711, 713 (1st Dep't
1980) (Fein, J., dissenting) ("the plea of surprise should be based on actual surprise, not
merely deficiencies in pleading").
42 See CPLR 3025, commentary at 486 (McKinney 1974).
4' See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
CPLR 3211(a)(5) (1970). Section 3211(a)(5) provides that "[a] party may move for
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the facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint are deemed admitted
as true.' It has been unclear, however, whether this procedural ad-
mission is sufficient to satisfy the judicial-admissions exception to
the statute of frauds set forth in section 8-319 of the Uniform
Commercial Code.3 Recently, in Boylan v. G.L. Morrow Co.,4 the
judgment dismissing one or more causes of action asserted against him on the ground that
...the cause of action may not be maintained because of. . . [the] statute of frauds." Id.
3211(a)(5); see H. WACHTELL, NEW YORK PRACTICE UNDER THE CPLR 220 (5th ed. 1976);
Long Island Pen Corp. v. Shatsky Metal Stamping Co., 94 App. Div. 2d 788, 789, 463
N.Y.S.2d 39, 40 (2d Dep't 1983).
"CPLR 3211 is the mechanical device by which dismissals on a variety of grounds are
sought before service of the answer." CPLR 3211, commentary at 9 (McKinney 1970). Al-
though primarily employed by a defendant desiring to dismiss a case commenced against
him, the statute is equally available for use by a plaintiff. See SIEGEL § 257, at 317; WK&M
1 3211.02, at 32-18. Section 3211(a) motions can be made only on the grounds enumerated
by the statute. CPLR 3211, commentary at 12 (McKinney 1970); see, e.g., CPLR 3211(a)(1)
(1970) (defense founded upon documentary evidence); id. 3211(a)(2) (lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction); id. 3211(a)(7) (failure to state a cause of action). Alleging the wrong grounds
for the dismissal, however, is not fatal provided that other 3211(a) grounds are applicable
and amendment of the motion will not result in prejudice to the opposing party. See SIEGEL
§ 258, at 319; Sawen Paper Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 72 App. Div.
2d 385, 388, 424 N.Y.S.2d 918, 920 (2d Dep't 1980); Yorkshire House Assocs. v. Lulkin, 114
Misc. 2d 40, 46, 450 N.Y.S.2d 962, 966 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1982). Section (e) of
CPLR 3211 provides that all 3211(a) motions must be made "before service of the respon-
sive pleading. . . ." CPLR 3211(e) (1970); see WK&M 1 3211.02, at 32-19. "With the excep-
tion of the trio of objections in paragraphs 2, 7 and 10 of subdivision (a), which may be
taken at any time, any subdivision (a) objection is waived if it is not taken either by 3211
motion or as a defense in the answer." SIEGEL § 274, at 331.
2 See, e.g., Sanders v. Winship, 57 N.Y.2d 391, 394, 442 N.E.2d 1231, 1233, 456
N.Y.S.2d 720, 722 (1982) (for purpose of 3211 motion to dismiss, court should accept allega-
tion as true, notwithstanding determination at trial); Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 484,
413 N.E.2d 1154, 1155, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592, 593 (1980) (for purpose of motion to dismiss court
must accept facts alleged as true); Crawford v. Cantor, 82 App. Div. 2d 791, 792, 440
N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (1st Dep't 1981) (allegation accepted as true for purpose of motion to
dismiss), aff'd, 56 N.Y.2d 529, 434 N.E.2d 1342, 449 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1982). Courts have drawn
a distinction between a 3211 motion to dismiss and a pure attack on the pleadings sup-
ported by extrinsic evidence. See WK&M 3211.36, at 32-113 to 32-114. In the latter situa-
tion, the court need not accept the allegations in the pleadings as true. Id. at 32-114; see
Rapport v. International Playtex Corp., 43 App. Div. 2d 393, 395, 352 N.Y.S.2d 241, 243 (3d
Dep't 1974). "In such case the criterion to be applied is whether the opposing party actually
has a cause of action or defense, not whether he has properly stated one." WK&M T 3211.36,
at 32-114; see, e.g., New York Tel. Co. v. Mobil Oil Co., 99 App. Div. 2d 185, 192-93, 473
N.Y.S.2d 172, 176-77 (1st Dep't 1984) (evidence of tests performed, introduced on motion to
dismiss, does not have to be accepted as true, but may undermine truthfulness of plead-
ings); Kaufman v. International Business Machs. Corp., 97 App. Div. 2d 925, 926-27, 470
N.Y.S.2d 720, 722-23 (3d Dep't 1983) (evidence introduced on motion to dismiss must be
sufficient to establish that plaintiff has no cause of action), af'd, 61 N.Y.2d 930, 463 N.E.2d
37, 474 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1984).
- N.Y. U.C.C. § 8-319 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). Section 8-319 (d) provides in perti-
nent part:
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Court of Appeals held that in a motion to dismiss, a defendant's
concession of an oral agreement with the plaintiff did not consti-
tute an affirmative admission sufficient to defeat the statute of
frauds defense.
In Boylan, the plaintiff, an employee of the defendant corpo-
ration, had decided to terminate his employment and start his own
business.0 To dissuade the plaintiff from leaving, the defendant of-
A contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by way of action or
defense unless
(d) the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testi-
mony or otherwise in court that a contract was made for sale of a stated quantity
of described securities at a defined or stated price.
Id. § 8-319(d). Section 2-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code contains a similar provision
relating to the the sale of goods. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b) (McKinney 1964).
While the language of the judicial-admissions exception of § 8-319 differs from that of §
2-201, there should be no difference in its construction. See 3 R ANDERSON, UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 8-319:6, at 790 (3d ed. 1985); Burns v. Gould, 172 Conn. 210, 217-18, 374
A.2d 193, 199 (1977); cf. Gross v. Vogel, 81 App. Div. 2d 576, 576, 437 N.Y.S.2d 431, 432 (2d
Dep't 1981) (when determining whether "sale of securities" is involved, § 8-319 should be
read in conformity with § 2-201). The purpose of the judicial admissions exception is to
prevent a party from admitting the existence of an oral agreement in his pleadings, while at
the same time relying on the statute of frauds as a defense. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-201, commen-
tary at 119 (McKinney 1964). "Under this section it is no longer possible to admit the con-
tract in court and still treat the Statute as a defense." Id.; see Note, The Application of the
Oral Admissions Exception to the Uniform Commercial Code's Statute of Frauds, 32 U.
FLA. L. REV. 486, 499 (1980); 3 R ANDERSON, supra, § 8-319:14, at 795; compare Kristinus v.
H. Stern Com. E. Ind. S. A., 466 F. Supp. 903, 904-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (defendant's admis-
sion of oral contract in motion to dismiss takes case out of statute of frauds) and St. Mary
& Co. v. Halberstadt, 61 App. Div. 2d 1105, 1105, 403 N.Y.S.2d 367, 368 (3d Dep't 1978)
(pre-answer motion to dismiss on grounds of statute of frauds denied; plaintiff entitled to
have evidence of oral contract developed) with Freeman v. Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 7
UCC REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 1052, 1054-55 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1970) (defendant's
motion to dismiss under 3211(a)(5) prior to interposition of answer denied; whether U.C.C.
§ 8-319(d) could cure insufficiency of writing can be ascertained only as action progresses)
and Reissman Int'l Corp. v. J. S. 0. Wood Prods., Inc., 10 UCC REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN)
1165, 1168 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1972) (impossible to determine whether defendant
will admit existence of oral contract through discovery or at trial when motion to dismiss
brought prior to discovery proceedings).
In Radix Org., Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 602 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1979), the Second Circuit
rejected the appellant's argument that the oral contract between itself and the appellees
should be enforceable pursuant to the judicial admissions exception of U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b).
Id. at 48. The appellees in Radix moved for summary judgment on the ground that there
was no writing satisfying the statute of frauds. Id. at 47. The court granted the motion for
summary judgment, reasoning that the appellees' admission in its Rule 9(g) statement as-
sumed the truth of the appellants allegations of the oral contract only for the purposes of
the motion. Id. at 48.
4 63 N.Y.2d 616, 468 N.E.2d 681, 479 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1984).
5 Id. at 618-19, 468 N.E.2d at 682, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
6 Id. at 620, 468 N.E.2d at 683, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 501 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
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fered him a raise, certain benefits, and a ten-percent interest in the
corporation.7 When the plaintiff failed to receive the promised
stock certificates that were to evidence his ownership in the corpo-
ration, he commenced an action seeking the value of his ten-per-
cent interest.8 Pursuant to section 3211(a) of the CPLR, the defen-
dant moved to dismiss on the ground that the oral agreement was
barred by the statute of frauds.9 The Supreme Court, Special
Term, Albany County, denied the motion,10 and the Appellate Di-
vision, Third Department, affirmed."
The Court of Appeals reversed in a memorandum decision,
reasoning that the judicial-admissions exception to section 8-319
requires an "affirmative admission that a contract was made for
the sale of a stated quantity of described securities at a defined or
stated price.' 1 2 The Court determined that the defendant's conces-
sion with respect to the existence of the oral agreement lacked the
requisite affirmation and certainty.' 3 The majority concluded that
the admission was merely a "recognition of the procedural context
in which the motion arose.""
In an exhaustive dissent, Judge Meyer maintained that
neither the language of section 8-319, the legislative history, nor
the judicial interpretation of the section are supportive of the ma-
Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
8 Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting). The plaintiff stated that he received all the perquisites
promised to him except the stock certificates. Boylan v. G.L. Morrow Co., 96 App. Div. 2d
983, 984, 466 N.Y.S.2d 832, 833 (3d Dep't 1983), rev'd, 63 N.Y.2d 616, 468 N.E.2d 681, 479
N.Y.S.2d 499 (1984).
- 63 N.Y.2d at 620, 468 N.E.2d at 683, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 501 (Meyer, J., dissenting); see
supra note 1 and accompanying text.
10 63 N.Y.2d at 620, 468 N.E.2d at 683, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 501 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
Special Term denied the dismissal based on the statute of frauds, reasoning that the defen-
dant had conceded the offer and acceptance of ten-percent ownership in the corporation. Id.
(Meyer, J., dissenting).
11 Boylan v. G.L. Morrow Co., 96 App. Div. 2d 983, 984, 466 N.Y.S.2d 832, 833 (3d
Dep't 1983), rev'd, 63 N.Y.2d 616, 468 N.E.2d 681, 479 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1984). Both Special
Term and the Appellate Division relied on Gross v. Vogel, 81 App. Div. 2d 576, 577, 437
N.Y.S.2d 431, 432 (2d Dep't 1981). In Gross, a pre-answer motion to dismiss under CPLR
3211(a)(5) was held improper because the complaint, accepted as true for the motion to
dismiss, adequately pleaded a cause of action for breach of contract. See id. at 577, 437
N.Y.S.2d at 433.
12 63 N.Y.2d at 619, 468 N.E.2d at 682, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 500; see N.Y. U.C.C. § 8-319
(McKinney Supp. 1984-1985); supra note 3.
1" 63 N.Y.2d at 619, 468 N.E.2d at 682, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 500. But see id. at 621, 468
N.E.2d at 683-84, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 500-01 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (quantity of securities is
ten percent of corporate stock and price is employee's continued employment).
14 Id. at 618, 468 N.E.2d at 682, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
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jority's holding. 15 The dissent asserted that the concession made
by the defendant for purposes of the motion to dismiss was an ad-
mission "otherwise in court," and as such should operate to remove
the contract from the statute of frauds.16 Any other conclusion,
Judge Meyer argued, would render the admissions exception mean-
ingless. 17 The dissent discussed the history of the statute of frauds
at length, noting that defendants have always been required to
deny the alleged oral contract before raising the statute as a de-
fense."8 The dissent noted that "denial of the existence of an oral
agreement is a sine qua non of reliance on the .. .Statute of
Frauds."' 9 Urging the Court to adopt this interpretation, Judge
Meyer contended that such a construction would be in accord with
the decisions of a majority of the states that have interpreted the
judicial admissions exception of the Code,20 and would therefore be
15 Id. at 619, 468 N.E.2d at 682, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 500 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
, Id. at 622, 468 N.E.2d at 684, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 502 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
'7 Id. at 623, 468 N.E.2d at 684-85, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 502-03 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Sec-
tion 8-319(d) provides that the admission must be made in the pleadings, testimony, or
otherwise in court to defeat the statute of frauds defense. N.Y. U.C.C. § 8-319(d) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1984-1985); see supra note 3. The dissent contended that a motion to dismiss
deprives the plaintiff of the opportunity to have the defendant make such an admission. 63
N.Y.2d at 623, 468 N.E.2d at 685, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 503 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Judge Meyer
argued that the Court's holding defeated the purpose of the judicial admissions exception:
If a prepleading motion to dismiss is permitted to defeat a cause of action on an
oral sales contract before plaintiff has had an opportuntiy to elicit from defendant
a statement in court of any kind, only malpractice by defendant's attorney would
subject the defendant to the statute's ameliorative purpose.
Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
"' 63 N.Y.2d at 624, 468 N.E.2d at 685, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 503 (Meyer, J., dissenting). For
a discussion of the history of the statute of frauds see Stevens, Ethics and the Statute of
Frauds, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 355, 381 (1952). Dean Stevens suggests that the statute of frauds
should be interpreted as it was in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: "[t]he statute
should not be recognized as a defense except where the defendant can and does deny the
contracting." Id. at 381.
,' 63 N.Y.2d at 627, 468 N.E.2d at 687, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 505 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
Professor Corbin has suggested that the statute of frauds defense should only be available to
those defendants who deny the making of the contract under oath. See 2 A. CORBIN, CON-
TRACTS § 275, at 13 (1950); see also Yonge, The Unheralded Demise of the Statute of
Frauds Welsher in Oral Contracts for the Sale of Goods and Investment Securities, 33
WASH. & LEE L REv. 1, 5 (1976) (quoting Corbin).
20 63 N.Y.2d at 627, 468 N.E.2d at 687, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 505 (Meyer, J., dissenting); see,
e.g., Hale v. Higginbotham, 228 Ga. 823, 825, 188 S.E.2d 515, 517 (1972) (statute of frauds
not bar to action when defendant admitted existence of oral contract in testimony);
Packwood Elevator Co. v. Heisdorffer, 260 N.W.2d 543, 547 (Iowa 1977) (admission takes
oral contract out of statute of frauds); Dehahn v. Innes, 356 A.2d 711, 718 (Me. 1976) (de-
fendant bound by admission of existence of oral contract).
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consistent with the policy of uniformity underlying the Code. 21
It is suggested that by granting a pre-answer motion to dis-
miss that admits the existence of an oral contract, the Court of
Appeals has undermined the purpose of the statute of frauds, al-
lowing it to be used to perpetrate fraud, rather than to prevent it. 22
The judicial admissions exception to the statute of frauds is in-
tended to prevent a party from simultaneously admitting an oral
contract and relying on the statute as a defense.23 Once a defen-
dant concedes the existence of an oral agreement, the purpose of
the statute has been satisfied, and the danger of fraud is reduced
significantly.24 This reasoning is supported in decisions of the
2 63 N.Y.2d at 627, 468 N.E.2d at 687, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 505 (Meyer, J., dissenting); see
N.Y. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c) (McKinney 1964). Section 1-102(2)(c) provides that one of the
"[u]nderlying purposes and policies of this Act [is] . . . to make uniform the law among the
various jurisdictions." Id. "This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its
underlying purposes and policies." Id. § 1-102(1).
22 Originally, the statute of frauds was enacted to protect parties from fraudulent
claims based on perjured testimony. See 2 A. CORBIN, supra note 19, at 360. Clearly, the
"statute was intended to be used as a shield, not a sword." Stevens, supra note 18, at 360.
That purpose is retained in the New York statute. See Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v.
Daystrom, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 372, 385, 248 N.E.2d 576, 583, 300 N.Y.S.2d 817, 828 (1969);
Morris Cohen & Co. v. Russell, 23 N.Y.2d 569, 574, 245 N.E.2d 712, 715, 297 N.Y.S.2d 947,
952 (1969).
23 See New York Law Revision Commission Study of the Uniform Commercial Code,
[19551 3 N.Y. LAW Rav. COMM'N REP. 1980; N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-201, official comment 7, at 119
(McKinney 1964). The Law Revision Commission stated specifically that the judicial admis-
sions exception prevents a party from admitting an oral contract and pleading the statute of
frauds. See New York Law Revision Commission Study of the Uniform Commercial Code,
[1955] 3 N.Y. LAW REv. COMM'N REP. 1980; Boylan v. G.L. Morrow Co., 63 N.Y.2d 616, 626,
468 N.E.2d 681, 686, 479 N.Y.S.2d 499, 504 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (involuntary as well as
voluntary admissions covered by statutory exception). The Official Comment to § 2-201 of
the Code states that, "[u]nder this section it is no longer possible to admit the contract in
court and still treat the Statute as a defense." N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-201, official comment 7, at
119 (McKinney 1964).
Referring to the judicial admissions exception, the Court of Appeals of Georgia, in Gar-
rison v. Piatt, 113 Ga. App. 94, 94, 147 S.E.2d 374, 375 (1966), stated that "[t]his provision
was designed to prevent the statute of frauds itself from becoming an aid to fraud, by
prohibiting one [from] claiming the benefit of the statute who admits in the case the oral
contract sued upon." Id. at 94, 147 S.E.2d at 375. In Cargill Inc., Commodity Mktg. Div. v.
Hale, 537 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976), the Court of Appeals of Missouri held that
the defendant's admission of a contract prevented the defendant from raising the statute of
frauds as a defense. See id. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Montana has stated that to
permit a defendant to rely on the statute of frauds as a defense to avoid an admitted obliga-
tion is to perpetrate a fraud. See Farmers Elevator Co. v. Anderson, 170 Mont. 175, 179, 552
P.2d 63, 65 (1976).
24 See 2 A. CORBIN, supra note 19, at 681. A purpose of the statute of frauds is to
prevent the enforcement of fraudulent claims against innocent parties. See id. It is submit-
ted that if the defendant admits to the contract that the plaintiff seeks to enforce, there is
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lower courts of New York25 and in the case law of other states.26 To
distinguish, as the Boylan Court did, between a procedural admis-
sion for the purposes of a motion to dismiss and other admissions
made in the context of a judicial proceeding, frustrates the policies
underlying the judicial admissions exception of the Code. This is
especially true, it is suggested, when a defendant satisfies the re-
quirements of section 8-319(d), as did the defendant in Boylan, by
admitting the making of a contract for a defined amount of securi-
ties at a stated price.28
The Boylan decision, it is further suggested, unnecessarily
protects a defendant's right to use the statute of frauds as a de-
fense. A balance must be reached between preserving the availabil-
ity of the defense and maintaining the integrity of the judicial sys-
tem. 29 Once a defendant admits an obligation, even in a procedural
no longer any danger that the plaintiff's claim is fraudulent. See Shedd, Statute of Frauds:
Judicial Admissions Exception-Where Has it Gone? Is It Coming Back?, 6 WHITTER L.
REV. 1, 6 (1984).
25 See, e.g., St. Mary & Co. v. Halberstadt, 61 App. Div. 2d 1105, 1105, 403 N.Y.S.2d
367, 367 (3d Dep't 1978); Weiss v. Wolin, 60 Misc. 2d 750, 753, 303 N.Y.S.2d 940, 943 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1969). After reviewing the legislative history of the statute of frauds as
evidenced by the report of the Law Revision Commission, the Weiss court determined that
a pre-answer motion based on the statute is premature because the contract is enforceable if
the defendant admits that it exists. 60 Misc. 2d at 753, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 943. The court
emphasized the language of the statute that indicated that oral contracts are no longer void,
but only unenforceable under the statute. Id. The court concluded that to grant a pre-an-
swer motion to dismiss would deny the plaintiff the opportunity to have the contract en-
forced. Id.
In Halberstadt, the defendant's failure to deny the existence of the contract caused the
Appellate Division, Third Department, to rule that the motion to dismiss was premature. 61
App. Div. 2d at 1105, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 367. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to
an opportunity for the development of facts sufficient to determine if the alleged contract
actually existed. See id.
26 See supra notes 20 & 23.
27 See N.Y. U.C.C. § 8-319, commentary at 277 (McKinney 1964); N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-201,
commentary at 119 (McKinney 1964); 3 R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, SALES AND BULK SALES
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2.04[3], at 2-78 to 2-82 (1982); see also supra note
23 and accompanying text (purpose of statute of frauds is to prevent fraud). If the defen-
dant admits that a contract exists, he cannot be defrauded by the plaintiff, and there is no
reason to allow the defendant to escape the contract. See Shedd, supra note 24, at 29. But
see Radix Org., Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 602 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[tlhe assertion of
[the statute of frauds] defense would be somewhat meaningless in the absence of an as-
sumed-for-the-argument oral agreement").
28 See N.Y. U.C.C. § 8-319(d) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); Boylan v. G.L. Morrow
Co., 63 N.Y.2d 616, 620-21, 468 N.E.2d 681, 683, 479 N.Y.S.2d 499, 501 (1984) (Meyer, J.,
dissenting).
29 See Shedd, supra note 24, at 3-4; Stevens, supra note 18, at 378. The judicial-admis-
sions exception is the proper vehicle with which to ensure that the statute does not prevent
the judicial system from reaching an unjust result. See Stevens, supra note 18, at 378; Car-
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context, the need to protect his right to rely on the statute of
frauds as a defense is eliminated, because neither the defendant
nor the court can be defrauded by the plaintiff.30 Moreover, a judi-
cial admission does not bar the defendant from contesting the va-
lidity or terms of the contract on other grounds."' It is submitted
that the purposes of the statute would be better served, and judi-
cial efficiency more effectively promoted, by giving full effect to the
judicial admissions exception to the statute of frauds.2
Colleen M. McIntosh
CPLR 4111: Special verdict answers do not require concurrence
by the same five jurors
Since 1937, New York has permitted verdicts in civil trials to
be rendered by five-sixths of the jury.' The authorizing statute
gill Inc., Commodity Mktg. Div. v. Hale, 537 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). Defen-
dants should not be allowed to avoid admitted obligations in the name of preventing plain-
tiffs from perpetrating non-existent frauds. See Stevens, supra note 18, at 378.
30 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. "Undeniably, the purpose of the statute
was to give assured protection against the risk . . . of convincing proof through perjured
testimony of an agreement that had never actually been entered into." Stevens, supra note
18, at 360. A defendant will not admit the existence of a contract that he did not make, and,
therefore, it is suggested, once the contract is admitted the defendant should not be pro-
tected by the statute.
31 See N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-201, official comment 7, at 119 (McKinney 1964); Comment,
U.C.C. 2-201(3)(b): The Search for the "Bargain-in-Fact" Through the Use of the Oral
Admissions Exception of the U.C.C. and its Impact on Other Contract Areas, 3 J. L. &
COM. 167, 176 (1983); see also Packwood Elevator Co. v. Heisdorffer, 260 N.W.2d 543, 547
(Iowa 1977) (plaintiff has burden of proving contract actually exists); Dehahn v. Innes, 356
A.2d 711, 719-23 (Me. 1976) (litigating tender of delivery, acceptance, revocation, and dam-
ages); Oregon Ridge Dinner Theatre, Inc. v. Hamlin, 253 Md. 462, 467-68, 253 A.2d 382, 384
(1969) (litigating validity of transfer of assets).
2 The history of the statute of frauds clearly indicates that its purpose was to prevent
the enforcement of fraudulent claims. See Stevens, supra note 18, at 355-71. It is suggested
that because a party does not ordinarily admit a contractual obligation to which he was not
a party, it is reasonable to hold the party bound, to the extent that he admits the obligation.
"[S]ince the statute of frauds was intended to provide justice by reducing frauds, doing
away with the judicial admission exception to discourage perjury achieves justice in the
same way as legalizing criminal activities in order to reduce crime." Shedd, supra note 24, at
28 n.144.
I See CPLR 4113(a) (1963). The statute provides: "A verdict may be rendered by not
